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ARTICLES
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Marla G. Decker *
Stephen R. McCullough **
I. INTRODUCTION
The authors have endeavored to select from the many appellate
cases those that have the most significant precedential value. The
article also outlines some of the most consequential changes en-
acted by the General Assembly in the areas of criminal law and
procedure.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
The defendant in Deville v. Commonwealth1 was convicted in a
bench trial of conspiring to commit grand larceny by false pre-
tenses.2 After trial, he filed a motion asserting that the Common-
wealth failed to disclose inconsistent statements from one of its
chief witnesses.3 The trial court denied the motion, noting that
* Deputy Attorney General, Public Safety and Enforcement Division, Office of the
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. B.A., 1980, Gettysburg College; J.D., 1983,
University of Richmond School of Law.
** Deputy State Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of
Virginia. B.A., 1994, University of Virginia, with high distinction; J.D., 1997, University of
Richmond School of Law, cum laude.
1. 47 Va. App. 754, 627 S.E.2d 530 (Ct. App. 2006).
2. Id. at 755, 627 S.E.2d at 531.
3. Id. at 756, 627 S.E.2d at 531.
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the defendant failed to show any prejudice.4 The Court of Appeals
of Virginia affirmed.5 The court held that, unless a finding of no
prejudice by the trial court in a bench trial is "patently unreason-
able," a finding of no prejudice by that court will negate any
showing of materiality for the undisclosed evidence.6 The court
reasoned that unlike a jury trial, where the trial and appellate
court must hypothesize about the impact of the non-disclosure on
a reasonable juror, in a bench trial setting, the appellate court
"know[s] with certitude, from the factfinder himself, that the out-
come of the proceeding would not have been different had the evi-
dence been disclosed earlier."7
B. Everybody Loves Raiment-Trial in Prison Clothes
In Jackson v. Washington,' a habeas corpus case, the Supreme
Court of Virginia ordered a new trial for a defendant who was
tried before a jury in his prison jumpsuit.9 Jail personnel had
misplaced the petitioner's clothes and trial counsel raised no ob-
jection.' The court reasoned that trying a defendant in prison
clothes before a jury tends to undermine the presumption of inno-
cence and undermines the fact-finding process.11 Moreover, the
record did not establish any tactical choice on the part of counsel
for proceeding to trial without civilian clothes. 2 Finally, the court
found that the evidence of the petitioner's guilt was not so over-
whelming as to erase the taint caused by the petitioner's appear-
ance.'
3
4. Id., 627 S.E.2d at 531-32.
5. Id. at 758, 627 S.E.2d at 533.
6. Id. at 757-58, 627 S.E.2d at 532.
7. Id. at 757, 627 S.E.2d at 532.
8. 270 Va. 269, 619 S.E.2d 92 (2005).
9. Id. at 280, 619 S.E.2d at 97-98.
10. Id. at 273, 619 S.E.2d at 93.
11. Id. at 276, 619 S.E.2d at 95 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05
(1976)).
12. Id. at 278, 619 S.E.2d at 96.
13. Id. at 279-80, 619 S.E.2d at 97 (noting that the Commonwealth's case was based
primarily on the circumstantial evidence of the defendant being in possession of stolen
property).
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C. Guilty Pleas
Two decisions from the Court of Appeals of Virginia highlight
the need to obtain the consent of the prosecution where a defen-
dant wishes to enter a conditional guilty plea. In Hill v. Com-
monwealth, 4 the defendant argued on appeal that the search
warrant used to search his home was totally lacking any indicia
of probable cause.1" The court declined to reach the issue, noting
that the record did not show any assent by the prosecution to a
conditional guilty plea.16 The conditional guilty plea statute, Vir-
ginia Code section 19.2-254, clearly requires the "consent of the
Commonwealth" for such pleas.' 7 Furthermore, under longstand-
ing precedent, a voluntary guilty plea waives all non-
jurisdictional issues.1 " Therefore, the court dismissed the ap-
peal.19
Similarly, in Witcher v. Commonwealth,2 ° the defendant sought
to enter a conditional guilty plea that would enable him to chal-
lenge the validity of his consent to a search. 2' The Commonwealth
objected to any conditional guilty plea.22 The defendant neverthe-
less pled guilty and appealed. 23 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
dismissed the appeal, noting that the consent of the Common-
wealth was a prerequisite to any such plea under the conditional
guilty plea statute.24
14. 47 Va. App. 667, 626 S.E.2d 459 (Ct. App. 2006).
15. Id. at 670, 626 S.E.2d at 461.
16. Id. at 672, 626 S.E.2d at 462.
17. Id. at 671, 626 S.E.2d at 461 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-254 (Repl. Vol. 2004 &
Cum. Supp. 2006)).
18. Id. at 673-74, 626 S.E.2d at 462-63 (quoting Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va.
534, 539, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1990)).
19. Id. at 676, 626 S.E.2d at 464.
20. 47 Va. App. 273, 623 S.E.2d 432 (Ct. App. 2005).
21. Id. at 274, 623 S.E.2d at 432.
22. Id. at 274-75, 623 S.E.2d at 432.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 275, 623 S.E.2d at 432-33 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-254 (Repl. Vol. 2004
& Cum. Supp. 2006)).
2006]
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D. Judicial Recusal
In Wilson v. Commonwealth,25 the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with
the intent to distribute because the trial judge failed to recuse
himself.2 6 The attorney for the defendant had requested a jury
trial once he learned the identity of the judge who would preside
over the case.27 The trial court sought to remove defense counsel
from the case and from the court appointed list, referenced de-
fense counsel's actions as "shenanigans," and stated that the
court did not want defense counsel appearing in the building as a
court appointed attorney.2" Finally, the trial court had refused to
accept a plea agreement, holding that it was untimely.29 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia concluded that these "actions reflected a
personal bias and prejudice against Wilson's counsel and raised
concerns about the judge's impartiality in the case and about the
public's perception of his fairness in the case."3 °
E. Sentencing-Prior Convictions
Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1 allows a jury to consider a de-
fendant's prior convictions during the sentencing phase of a
trial.31 The Court of Appeals of Virginia held in Oliver v. Com-
monwealth3 2 that prior convictions under the Code of Military
Justice can be considered by a Virginia jury.33 Such convictions
unquestionably constitute prior "convictions. . . 'under the laws of
... the United States' under section 19.2-295.1."4 The court re-
served for another day the issue of whether such convictions
might be subject to a collateral attack when they are based on
violations of the Federal Constitution. The court noted that the
25. 272 Va. 19, 630 S.E.2d 326 (2006).
26. Id. at 30, 630 S.E.2d at 332.
27. Id. at 23, 630 S.E.2d at 328.
28. Id. at 23-24, 630 S.E.2d at 328.
29. Id. at 25, 630 S.E.2d at 329.
30. Id. at 30, 630 S.E.2d at 332.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
32. 46 Va. App. 613, 620 S.E.2d 567 (Ct. App. 2005).
33. Id. at 617, 620 S.E.2d at 569.
34. Id. at 615-16, 620 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Repl. Vol.
2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006)).
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defendant did not point to any such defects with regard to his
conviction. 5
In a similar vein, the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded
that a conviction under a municipal ordinance was admissible
during the sentencing part of a jury trial. In Auer v. Common-
wealth,36 the court of appeals reviewed whether the trial court
erred by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce a prior convic-
tion for driving under the influence during the sentencing phase
of the trial.37 The conviction was based on a local ordinance.38 The
defendant objected on the basis that such ordinances did not con-
stitute laws of a "state" under Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1.' 9
The court disagreed, noting that while the text of section 19.2-
295.1 was ambiguous, its purpose was not. 40 The statute clearly
seeks to allow the jury to assess an appropriate punishment. A
defendant's complete criminal record, including municipal ordi-
nances, was therefore appropriately submitted for the jury's con-
sideration.4'
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The law regarding search and seizure is extremely dependant
upon application of facts to basic legal principles. This year, there
were many published and unpublished opinions addressing
Fourth Amendment claims. There were also some significant de-
cisions by the Supreme Court of United States. We have selected
a few significant Virginia cases to highlight these changes.
A. Entry Into the Curtilage
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia will review the case in
the fall, its importance warrants discussion here. In Robinson v.
Commonwealth,42 the Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en
35. Id. at 616, 620 S.E.2d at 569.
36. 46 Va. App. 637, 621 S.E.2d 140 (Ct. App. 2005).
37. Id. at 642, 621 S.E.2d at 142.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 644, 621 S.E.2d at 143.
40. Id. at 646-48, 621 S.E.2d at 144.
41. Id. at 650-51, 621 S.E.2d at 146.
42. 47 Va. App. 533, 625 S.E.2d. 651 (Ct. App. 2006) (en banc).
20061
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banc, considered whether the police violated the defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights when the officer drove up the driveway
to the Robinsons' home, parked, and ultimately entered their
backyard after observing criminal activity. 43 The court affirmed
the defendants' multiple convictions for contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor and found that the police did not violate the
Robinsons' Fourth Amendment rights."
The police had been dispatched to the Robinsons' home late in
the evening to investigate complaints that there was a party on
the premises and minors were being served alcohol. 45 The re-
sponding officer saw a number of cars parked on the street and in
the driveway. 46 Flood lights were illuminating the driveway and
house.47 Once the officer pulled his marked police car into the
driveway and began driving toward the back of the house, two in-
dividuals, both of whom appeared to be underage, looked at the
police car, yelled "cops," dropped the beer bottles that they were
holding, and ran towards the nearby woods.' The officer parked
his police car in the driveway and got out.49 He ordered everyone
to stop running and radioed to his backup officers, who were wait-
ing off property, to advise them that individuals were running
through the woods.50
Mrs. Robinson claimed that because the investigating officer
was located in the curtilage of their home without their express
permission when he saw the illegal activity, the resulting search
violated her Fourth Amendment rights.5 ' Mr. Robinson argued
that although the officer's initial entry onto the property was law-
ful, his further intrusion on the property was unlawful because he
lacked exigent circumstances to enter the backyard.52 The court
rejected both arguments. First, the court found that based upon
the circumstances of the night in question, the Robinsons had
impliedly consented to allow the public, which includes the police,
43. Id. at 540-41, 625 S.E.2d at 654-55.
44. Id. at 562, 625 S.E.2d at 665.
45. Id. at 540, 625 S.E.2d at 654.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 540-41, 625 S.E.2d at 654.
49. Id. at 541, 625 S.E.2d at 654.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 544, 625 S.E.2d at 656.
52. Id. at 543, 625 S.E.2d at 656.
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to enter the premises through use of the driveway in order to con-
tact them.5" Further, the officer did not exceed the scope of the
consent because he observed the criminal activity while proceed-
ing up the driveway.54 Second, the court rejected the notion that
once the officer confirmed his suspicion that underage individuals
were being served alcoholic beverages, he should have immedi-
ately secured a search warrant before proceeding to the back-
yard.5" The court found that the facts of the case supported the
conclusion that the officer had probable cause to believe that
crimes were being committed and that exigent circumstances
supported a warrantless entry into the backyard.56
B. Lawfulness of a Stop
In Shiflett v. Commonwealth, 7 a game warden observed the de-
fendant leave a market, "get into a vehicle, and drive onto a pub-
lic highway."5 " The officer proceeded to follow the defendant's ve-
hicle and stop it. 59 Five months earlier, the officer had issued the
defendant a summons and, at that time, the officer had deter-
mined from checking the defendant's driving record that his driv-
ing privilege was revoked because he had been adjudicated an
habitual offender.6 ° The officer discussed the defendant's habitual
offender status with him when he issued the summons.61 Thus, at
the time of the traffic stop, five months later, the officer had rea-
son to believe that the defendant was driving without a license af-
ter having been adjudicated an habitual offender.62 Further, the
officer "observed objects 'dangling' from the rearview mirror of
[defendant's] vehicle."63 The defendant challenged the stop, alleg-
ing that the officer lacked "reasonable, articulable suspicion of
53. Id. at 545, 626 S.E.2d at 656-57.
54. Id. at 551, 625 S.E.2d at 659.
55. Id. at 556, 625 S.E.2d at 662.
56. Id. at 559, 625 S.E.2d at 663 ("Officer Cox could reasonably have believed that
multiple, underage individuals had . . . consumed significant quantities of alcohol. ...
[Tihese individuals .. . may have attempted to drive home, placing both themselves and
the general public at risk of significant harm.").
57. 47 Va. App. 141, 622 S.E.2d 758 (Ct. App. 2005).
58. Id. at 144, 622 S.E.2d at 759.
59. Id., 622 S.E.2d at 759-60.
60. Id., 622 S.E.2d at 759.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 147, 622 S.E.2d at 761.
63. Id. at 144, 622 S.E.2d at 759.
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unlawful conduct to justify an investigatory traffic stop."64 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia found that the trial court correctly
ruled that the investigatory stop was proper.65 It held that:
Because of [the officer's] recent knowledge of [defendant's] habitual
offender status and his discussion with [defendant] about that
status, [the officer] possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion at
the time of the stop that criminal activity was "afoot," i.e. that
Shiflett was driving on a public highway without the privilege to do
so, after having been declared an habitual offender.
66
The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the officer was
merely acting on a "hunch" and that the stop was unlawful be-
cause less intrusive means of verifying his driving status was
available.67
C. Misdemeanor Stop and Release Statute
In another case that will be reviewed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, Moore v. Commonwealth,6" the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, sitting en banc, affirmed the defendant's conviction for pos-
session of cocaine with intent to distribute.69 The court of appeals
held that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to
suppress evidence."° The defendant was arrested for driving on a
suspended license.71 Despite the fact that it was a misdemeanor
offense and, under Virginia Code section 19.2-74, he should have
been released on a summons,72 the defendant was arrested.73
Crack-cocaine and cash were later found on the defendant's per-
son, and he was charged with the drug offense. 74 The defendant
argued that the custodial arrest on the misdemeanor offense was
unlawful and violated his Fourth Amendment rights.75 The court
of appeals held that "although the arrest violated the express
64. Id. at 143, 622 S.E.2d at 759.
65. Id. at 149-50, 622 S.E.2d at 762.
66. Id. at 147, 622 S.E.2d at 761.
67. Id. at 147-49, 622 S.E.2d at 761-62.
68. 47 Va. App. 55, 622 S.E.2d 253 (Ct. App. 2005) (en banc).
69. Id. at 60-61, 622 S.E.2d at 256, appeal granted, No. 052619 (Va. May 31, 2006).
70. Id. at 69, 622 S.E.2d at 260.
71. Id. at 59, 622 S.E.2d at 255.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
73. Moore, 47 Va. App. at 59, 622 S.E.2d at 255.
74. Id. at 60, 622 S.E.2d at 255.
75. Id. at 61, 622 S.E.2d at 256.
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provisions of Code § 19.2-74, the arrest and resulting search did
not violate [defendant]'s constitutional-as opposed to statutory-
rights."76 The court further reasoned that because section 19.2-74
does not provide for the remedy of exclusion of evidence, the trial
court's ruling, denying the motion to suppress, was correct.
77
D. Probable Cause
In Brown v. Commonwealth,78 the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the defendant's convictions for possession of cocaine and
possession of heroin based upon a finding that the police officer
lacked probable cause to arrest and search the defendant. 79 The
police officer was patrolling an area associated with recent shoot-
ings and homicides.8 ° He saw a vehicle parked in an alley in a
manner that would obstruct access by emergency vehicles.8 1 The
officer approached the parked car on foot. 2 Four men who were
standing near the car quickly walked away. 3 The officer looked
into the vehicle and saw the defendant asleep in the front pas-
senger's seat.84 He was holding a hand-rolled, partially burnt
cigarette in one hand and a lighter in the other.8 5 Based upon his
knowledge and experience, the officer suspected that the cigarette
might contain an illegal substance. 6 Consequently, he woke up
the defendant, "took the items out of his hands, and asked him to
step out of the vehicle."87 The defendant was arrested and
searched. 8 Tests later confirmed that the cigarette and a folded
five dollar bill from defendant's pocket "contained traces of co-
caine and heroin, respectively." 9 The supreme court found that
despite the officer's strong, reasonable suspicion that the hand-
76. Id. at 61-62, 622 S.E.2d at 256.
77. Id. at 62, 622 S.E.2d at 256.
78. 270 Va. 414, 620 S.E.2d 760 (2005).
79. Id. at 417, 422, 620 S.E.2d at 761, 764.
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rolled cigarette contained contraband, that alone did not support
probable cause to arrest.9" Based upon the totality of the circum-
stances, the court held that at the time of the arrest and search,
the officer lacked probable cause and the motion to suppress the
evidence should have been granted.91
E. Scope of Search
In Dotson v. Commonwealth,92 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the trial court correctly denied the defendant's motion
to suppress evidence and affirmed his convictions for drug of-
fenses.93 Police had secured a warrant to search the defendant's
home "for drugs and items related to the possession or manufac-
ture of drugs."94 During the search, in addition to seizing drug
paraphernalia and other drug related items, the police seized a
small, locked safe which they were unable to open at the resi-
dence." The officers took the safe to the Narcotics Task Force of-
fice and had a locksmith open it fifteen days after the search.96
Marijuana was found inside the safe.97 The court of appeals re-
jected the defendant's arguments that the police unlawfully
seized the safe because it was not named in the warrant and
drugs were not likely to be found inside.9" It also rejected the de-
fendant's contention that in order to open the safe, the police
needed the owner's permission or a second warrant.99 The court
held that the seizure of the safe was reasonable and within the
scope of the warrant.100 It also concluded that, based upon the re-
cord, the search of the safe fifteen days after it was seized was
reasonable.' 0
90. Id. at 421, 620 S.E.2d at 764.
91. Id. at 422, 620 S.E.2d at 764.
92. 47 Va. App. 237, 623 S.E.2d 414 (Ct. App. 2005).
93. Id. at 247, 623 S.E.2d at 419.




98. Id. at 242-45, 623 S.E.2d at 416-18.
99. Id. at 245-46, 623 S.E.2d at 418.
100. Id. at 246, 623 S.E.2d at 418.
101. Id.
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In Rosa v. Commonwealth,112 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
found that it was reasonable for an officer who was executing a
search of a computer, pursuant to a warrant, to open computer
files in order to determine whether they fell within the purview of
the warrant."3 In reaching this decision, the court relied heavily
upon the content of the warrant and the specific facts of the case.
The court concluded that the officer, acting upon a warrant that
authorized a search of all "'electronic processing and storage de-
vices, computer and computer devices, [and] external storage de-
vices,"' without limitations, was permitted to inspect any section
of the computer that might contain "objects of the search, includ-
ing deleted files that had been re-created."'14
IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Virginia Courts addressed a number of evidentiary issues that
arose in the criminal context.
A. Adoptive Admissions and Burden of Proof for Hearsay
Exceptions
In Lynch v. Commonwealth,1°' three men perpetrated a rob-
bery, during which one of the victims was shot and killed.'O6 Soon
after the crime, as one of the perpetrators discussed the robbery,
the defendant arrived in the room and said "'why is you telling
them what we just done?""' The prosecution sought to admit this
testimony at trial as an adoptive admission by the defendant. 08
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that, under these circum-
stances, the statement was properly admitted.' 9 The court noted
that adoptive admissions are admissible provided: "(1) the defen-
dant must have heard the incriminating statements, (2) he must
have understood that they accused him of complicity in a crime,
(3) the circumstances afforded him a fair opportunity to deny or
102. 48 Va. App. 93, 628 S.E.2d 92 (Ct. App. 2006).
103. Id. at 103, 628 S.E.2d at 96-97.
104. Id. (alteration in original).
105. 272 Va. 204, 630 S.E.2d 482 (2006).
106. Id. at 206, 630 S.E.2d at 483.
107. Id. at 207, 630 S.E.2d at 483.
108. Id. at 206, 630 S.E.2d at 483.
109. Id. at 209-10, 630 S.E.2d at 485.
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object, and (4) the circumstances would naturally call for a re-
ply." 11
0
The court held that the defendant's statement satisfied these
criteria. 1 ' The court acknowledged that, while the defendant was
not initially a party to the conversation, "he obviously heard
enough of it to propel him into the house and up the stairs to con-
front them."" 2
The court further clarified that a party seeking to admit a
statement as an exception to the hearsay rule must show by a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the statement is admissible." 3
B. Certificates of Analysis
In Bell v. Commonwealth,114 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
examined the requirements of Virginia Code section 19.2-187."5
That statute provides an exception to the rules excluding hearsay
evidence by allowing the prosecution to admit into evidence a cer-
tificate of analysis of drugs." 6 However, to be admissible, certain
conditions must be satisfied. 117 The certificate must be filed with
the clerk's office at least seven days before trial and, upon request
by the defendant's attorney, a copy must be mailed to counsel ei-
ther by the clerk or by the prosecution. 118 In Bell, the defendant
had received a copy of the certificate in the general district
court." 9 However, despite defense counsel's request, neither the
prosecution nor the clerk's office had timely furnished him with a
copy prior to the trial in circuit court. 20 The court of appeals con-
cluded that strict construction of the penal statute required ex-
110. Id. at 209, 630 S.E.2d at 484 (citing Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 699,
43 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1947)).
111. Id. at 209-10, 630 S.E.2d at 485.
112. Id. at 209, 630 S.E.2d at 485.
113. Id. at 207-08 & n.*, 630 S.E.2d at 484 & n.*.
114. 47 Va. App. 126, 622 S.E.2d 751 (Ct. App. 2005).
115. See id. at 134-39, 622 S.E.2d at 754-57.
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 47 Va. App. at 131, 622 S.E.2d at 753.
120. Id.
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clusion of the certificate.12' This is true even where, as in this
case, the defendant had notice of the prosecution's intent to rely
on the certificate. 
122
C. Certified Records
The uncertainty surrounding the scope of the Supreme Court of
the United States's decision in Crawford v. Washington12' has led
to a number of challenges to documents formerly deemed unobjec-
tionable. In Michels v. Commonwealth,124 the defendant hatched
a scheme under which he promised to invest the victim's money
in a particular Delaware corporation. 2 ' At trial, the prosecution
adduced certified copies of statements from the Delaware Secre-
tary of State in which the Secretary stated that a diligent search
of government records showed that no such corporation existed. 1
26
The defendant contended that admitting these documents vio-
lated his constitutional right to confront witnesses.'27 The Court
of Appeals of Virginia rejected the argument, holding that the re-
cords were not "testimonial."2 ' The court reasoned that the ex-
hibits at issue were not "accusatory" because they did not allege
any criminal conduct on the part of the defendant.'29 Addition-
ally, such documents do not resemble the type of documents
found objectionable by the Court in Crawford.13 Instead, the
documents "are a neutral repository of information that reflects
the objective results of a search of public records." 3 1 The court
also cited precedent from other states holding that such docu-
ments were admissible. 1
32
121. Id. at 138-39, 622 S.E.2d at 757.
122. See id. at 139, 622 S.E.2d at 757.
123. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
124. 47 Va. App. 461, 624 S.E.2d 675 (Ct. App. 2006).
125. Id. at 464, 624 S.E.2d at 677.
126. Id. at 465, 624 S.E.2d at 677.
127. Id., 624 S.E.2d at 677-78.
128. Id. at 469, 624 S.E.2d at 680.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 470, 624 S.E.2d at 680.
131. Id. at 469, 624 S.E.2d at 680.
132. Id. at 467-69, 624 S.E.2d at 678-80 (citing People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d
230, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Shreck, 107 P.3d 1048, 1060-61 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005)).
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D. Court Ordered Psychiatric Examination of a Victim
In Nobrega v. Commonwealth,133 the Supreme Court of Virginia
reviewed a conviction for the rape and sexual assault of a child
under the age of thirteen, in response to defendant's claim that
the trial court erred in its denial of defendant's motion for an in-
dependent psychiatric or psychological examination of the com-
plaining witness.'34 The Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded
that the trial court had no authority to order such an examina-
tion. 135 The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed.'36 The supreme
court reasoned that no statute provides for such an examination
and that providing for such determinations would be a policy
matter best left to the General Assembly. 137 Moreover, the court
explained, the defendant's right to adduce evidence in his favor is
not implicated by such a request. 138 The court also noted that
while defendants are entitled to call for evidence in their favor,
the Constitution of Virginia also mandates respect for the dignity
of crime victims.139 Finally, the court observed that a defendant's
rights are safeguarded because he has an opportunity to conduct
voir dire of a witness concerning the competency of the victim to
testify, and a trial court must make a determination concerning
the witness's competency. 4 ° Furthermore, a defendant can in ap-
propriate cases seek to examine mental health records of the vic-
tim.' Such safeguards, the court held, are sufficient to protect
the defendant's rights.'42
E. Recent Complaint
At issue in Wilson v. Commonwealth4 3 was whether a letter
written by the victim qualified as a "recent complaint" under Vir-
133. 271 Va. 508, 628 S.E.2d 922 (2006).
134. Id. at 512, 628 S.E.2d at 923.
135. Id. at 514, 628 S.E.2d at 924-25.
136. Id. at 517-18, 628 S.E.2d at 926.
137. Id. at 516, 628 S.E.2d at 925-26.
138. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 926.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 517, 628 S.E.2d at 926.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. 46 Va. App. 73, 615 S.E.2d 500 (Ct. App. 2005).
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ginia Code section 19.2-268.2.'4 The defendant repeatedly mo-
lested his daughter beginning in the spring of 2000 and ending in
the spring of 2003.14' The victim's grandmother noticed peculiar
behavior by the victim and suspected something was amiss.
146
The victim would not discuss the abuse but agreed to write a let-
ter to her grandmother in August of 2003.147 In the letter, the vic-
tim wrote about the abuse she had suffered." 8 At trial, the defen-
dant argued that the letter should not be admitted as a "recent
complaint" of sexual abuse because the abuse had started two
years before the letter was written.' 49 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia disagreed. The court held that such statements are only
inadmissible if the delay "'is unexplained or is inconsistent with
the occurrence of the offense. '""5 The court noted that the trial
court committed no abuse of discretion considering the "daugh-
ter's impressionable age, the ongoing nature of the abuse, and the
family relationship between the parties."'' The victim also testi-
fied about her fear of retaliation and her shame.'52 Under such
circumstances, the delay was neither "'unexplained,'" nor was it
"'inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense."'153
V. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Abduction
After the General Assembly abolished the requirement that the
prosecution prove asportation during an abduction, the Supreme
Court of Virginia concluded in Brown v. Commonwealth' that
where a detention is intrinsic to a crime, as in cases of robbery,
rape, or assault, a defendant cannot be convicted of both abduc-
144. Id. at 77, 615 S.E.2d at 502.
145. See id. at 79, 615 S.E.2d at 502-03.
146. See id. at 79-80, 615 S.E.2d at 503.
147. Id. at 80, 615 S.E.2d at 503.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 84, 615 S.E.2d at 505 (quoting Woodard v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 24,
27, 448 S.E.2d 328, 330 (Ct. App. 1994)).
151. Id. at 85, 615 S.E.2d at 506.
152. See id., 615 S.E.2d at 505-06.
153. Id. at 84, 615 S.E.2d at 505.
154. 230 Va. 310, 337 S.E.2d 711 (1985).
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tion and the related crime.1 5 In Pryor v. Commonwealth,1 56 the
Court of Appeals of Virginia declined to extend this doctrine to a
homicide case. 157 The court reasoned that "an abduction preced-
ing a murder can never be said to be legally 'inherent in the act'
of murder."'5 8 Moreover, the abduction in the case occurred before
the murder. 59 The victim was restrained and tied with tape while
the defendant searched for a bag with which to suffocate her.'6
Therefore, the defendant was properly convicted of both abduc-
tion and murder. 161
B. Aggravated Involuntary Manslaughter
The distinction between involuntary manslaughter and aggra-
vated involuntary manslaughter was at issue in Wyatt v. Com-
monwealth.'62 The Court of Appeals of Virginia summarized the
evidence as follows:
Appellant-despite knowing he (a) was beneath the legal drinking
age, (b) had consumed six or seven alcoholic beverages in under
three hours, and (c) was "buzzed"-chose to get behind the wheel of
his automobile. While driving home after dark on a clear, dry night
on a straight, well-paved and clearly marked two-lane road, appel-
lant failed to maintain proper control of his vehicle and drove so that
it was entirely in the lane of oncoming traffic. Despite visibility of at
least 100 yards, he also failed to see a car approaching from the op-
posite direction, in its proper lane of travel, until it was too late for
him to avoid the impact or take any evasive action. 1
63
The court affirmed the defendant's conviction for aggravated in-
voluntary manslaughter, holding this evidence was sufficient to
show that the defendant exhibited "'a reckless or indifferent dis-
regard of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably
calculated to produce injury,"' and moreover, that the defendant
"knew or should have known the probable results of his acts."'"
155. See id. at 313-14, 337 S.E.2d at 713.
156. 48 Va. App. 1, 628 S.E.2d 47 (Ct. App. 2006).
157. Id. at 8, 628 S.E.2d at 50.
158. Id. at 6, 628 S.E.2d at 49 (citing Brown, 230 Va. at 314, 337 S.E.2d at 714).
159. Id. at 7, 628 S.E.2d at 50.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 8, 628 S.E.2d at 50.
162. 47 Va. App. 411, 624 S.E.2d 118 (Ct. App. 2006).
163. Id. at 422, 624 S.E.2d at 124.
164. Id. at 419, 624 S.E.2d at 122.
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C. Aggravated Sexual Battery
In Martin v. Commonwealth,165 the fourteen-year-old defendant
was convicted of aggravated sexual battery. 166 He had exposed his
penis to the eight-year-old victim and successfully asked the vic-
tim to masturbate the defendant. 167 He sought to set his convic-
tion aside, arguing that he had not committed "an overt act of ac-
tual force."16 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this
argument, noting that "force" includes actual or constructive
force, and constructive force "includes engaging in proscribed
conduct with a victim who is under the legal age of consent." 1
69
The court found nothing incongruous with the "use of a common
set of facts for proof of differing elements of a crime," i.e. the vic-
tim's age and the element of force. 7 0
D. Assault on a Police Officer
In South v. Commonwealth, 7' the Court of Appeals of Virginia
examined whether a Navy police officer serving on a naval base
qualifies as a "law-enforcement officer" under Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-57(E). 7 2 That Virginia Code provision defines "law-
enforcement officer[s]" as employees "of a police department or
sheriffs office which is part of or administered by the Common-
wealth or any political subdivision thereof."173 The court con-
cluded that under the plain language of the statute, the Navy of-
ficers were not "police officers" 174 and, therefore, reversed the
felony conviction for assault on a police officer.' 75 The Supreme
Court of Virginia subsequently reinstated the conviction for the
lesser included offense of assault and battery, noting that "the
Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case for a new trial, in-
stead of simply remanding the case for a new sentencing proceed-
165. 272 Va. 31,630 S.E.2d 291 (2006).
166. Id. at 33, 630 S.E.2d at 291.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 34, 630 S.E.2d at 292.
169. Id. at 35, 630 S.E.2d at 292.
170. Id., 630 S.E.2d at 293.
171. 47 Va. App. 247, 623 S.E.2d 419 (Ct. App. 2005).
172. See id. at 251, 623 S.E.2d at 420-21.
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(E) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
174. South, 47 Va. App. at 251, 623 S.E.2d at 421.
175. Id. at 256, 623 S.E.2d at 423.
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ing on the lesser included offense for which the petitioner was
validly convicted."176
E. Attempted Capital Murder of a Police Officer
The Supreme Court of Virginia found the evidence sufficient to
affirm a conviction of attempted capital murder on a police officer
in Coles v. Commonwealth.77 There, the defendant initially ap-
peared to acquiesce in a police stop of his vehicle.i"' However, he
then accelerated in the direction of a police officer, struck the po-
lice cruiser, pushing it towards the officer, and drove away. 7 9 The
court held this evidence sufficient to show premeditation, which
need only exist for a moment, and. a specific intent to kill.' Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that the evidence, and in particular
the positions of the defendant's car and of the police officer, belied
the defendant's argument that he was merely trying to escape.'
F. Attempted Capital Murder for Hire
In Ashford v. Commonwealth,l"2 the defendant sought to have
his wife killed.'83 He first asked an inmate, and later a police offi-
cer posing as a "hit man," to carry out the murder. " Ashford
gave the police officer money, a detailed map, and instructions to
carry out the murder. ' He was charged with attempted murder
for hire.8 6 At trial and on appeal, he asserted that he could be
convicted of, at most, solicitation for murder, because the police
officer did not make any actual attempt to kill his wife.8 7 There-
fore, he argued, the necessary overt act had not occurred.8 8 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld his conviction, noting that
176. Commonwealth v. South, 272 Va. 1, 1, 630 S.E.2d 318, 319 (2006).
177. 270 Va. 585, 621 S.E.2d 109 (2005).
178. Id. at 588, 621 S.E.2d at 110.
179. Id. at 588-89, 621 S.E.2d at 110-11.
180. Id. at 590-91, 621 S.E.2d at 112.
181. Id.
182. 47 Va. App. 676, 626 S.E.2d 464 (Ct. App. 2006).
183. Id. at 679, 626 S.E.2d at 465.
184. Id. at 679-80, 626 S.E.2d at 465-66.
185. Id. at 680, 626 S.E.2d at 466.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 681-82, 626 S.E.2d at 466-67.
188. Id. at 681, 626 S.E.2d at 466.
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the defendant's acts went well beyond mere preparation."8 9 The
court said the law should "not require the hit man to perform the
useless act of pretending to actually shoot appellant's wife."
190
The court observed that "[t]o hold otherwise would be to render
the offense 'attempted murder for hire' a nullity." 91
G. Carnal Knowledge
While the law has generally moved away from requiring "magic
words," a level of linguistic precision is nevertheless required un-
der certain circumstances. In Welch v. Commonwealth,92 the de-
fendant was convicted of carnal knowledge after the fourteen-
year-old victim testified about her "sexual relationship" with
him.'93 The victim did not further detail what this term com-
prised.'94 The Supreme Court of Virginia held this testimony did
not suffice for a conviction. 9 5 The court explained that "carnal
knowledge" is established only if the Commonwealth proves cer-
tain specified acts.' 96 Vague terms, the court observed, "invite
speculation that cannot suffice for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."'97
H. Crimes Against Nature
In a pair of related decisions, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
examined the impact of the decision in Lawrence v. Texas' 98 on
Virginia's "crimes against nature" statute. In Tjan v. Common-
wealth'99 and Singson v. Commonwealth,00 the court of appeals
reviewed the convictions of two individuals who were appre-
hended when they asked undercover detectives in a public de-
189. Id. at 684, 626 S.E.2d at 467-68.
190. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 468.
191. Id.
192. 271 Va. 558, 628 S.E.2d 340 (2006).
193. Id. at 560-62, 628 S.E.2d at 341-42.
194. Id. at 562, 628 S.E.2d at 342.
195. Id. at 565, 628 S.E.2d at 344.
196. Id. at 563-64, 628 S.E.2d at 342-43.
197. Id. at 564, 628 S.E.2d at 343.
198. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects voluntary sex-
ual conduct by consenting adults in private).
199. 46 Va. App. 698, 621 S.E.2d 669 (Ct. App. 2005).
200. 46 Va. App. 724, 621 S.E.2d 682 (Ct. App. 2005).
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partment store bathroom if they could perform fellatio on the offi-
cers. 
201
In Singson, the defendant first argued that the crimes against
nature statute was facially invalid on Due Process grounds.2 °2
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the defendant had no
standing to raise such a challenge, because his own conduct,
which occurred "in a public place ... not a private location" was
not constitutionally protected. 2 3 The court explained that "the
Supreme Court explicitly noted that [Lawrence] did not 'involve
public conduct or prostitution.' 2 4 Singson also contended that
the statute was overbroad because it chilled his First Amendment
rights.20 5 The court noted that the solicitation statute, in conjunc-
tion with the sodomy statute, was directed at non-expressive sex-
ual conduct rather than speech. 206 The court further held that any
effect the statute might have on speech proposing private acts of
sodomy among consenting adults was hypothetical and incidental
and did not justify invalidating the statute on its face.20 7 There-
fore, the court declined to hold that the statute was "substantially
overbroad."2 °s
In Tjan, the Court of Appeals of Virginia again concluded the
defendant lacked standing to challenge the statute on over-
breadth grounds.20 9 The court held that the defendant's public
conduct was not constitutionally protected, and he could not chal-
lenge the statute as it might be applied to others in hypothetical
situations. 210 The court noted that the statute informed a reason-
able person of the prohibited conduct, and it was, therefore, not
void for vagueness.211 Finally, the court found no equal protection
violation because the statutory text did not draw any distinctions
between homosexuals and heterosexuals and moreover, the stat-
201. Tjan, 46 Va. App. at 703-04, 621 S.E.2d at 671-72; Singson, 46 Va. App. at 731,
621 S.E.2d at 685.
202. 46 Va. App. at 732, 621 S.E.2d at 685.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 736, 621 S.E.2d at 687 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003)).
205. Id. at 743, 621 S.E.2d at 691.
206. Id. at 742-43, 621 S.E.2d at 690-91.
207. Id. at 747, 621 S.E.2d at 693.
208. Id. at 748, 621 S.E.2d at 693.
209. 46 Va. App. 698, 713, 621 S.E.2d 669, 676 (Ct. App. 2005).
210. Id. at 706, 621 S.E.2d at 672-73.
211, Id. at 708, 621 S.E.2d at 673.
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ute permissibly draws distinctions based on behavior, not per-
sons. 212 In short, the statute "'does not create an impermissible
classification between groups of people similarly situated."'2 3
I. Indecent Liberties
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
addressed whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the
defendant was in a "supervisory" relationship with a child he
sexually molested,214 as that term is defined in Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-370.1.215 In Gilbert v. Commonwealth,216 the defendant
was the manager of a bagel store where the victim was an em-
ployee.2 17 The defendant molested the fifteen-year-old victim at
the store after his shift had ended. 21' The court held that the de-
fendant, who was responsible for employment decisions, schedul-
ing, and overseeing the employees, was clearly in a supervisory
relationship over the victim and was therefore properly con-
victed.219
J. Larceny
In a succinct decision, McAlevy v. Commonwealth,22 ° the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that the element of asportation in a
larceny case can be established by proving that the defendant
used an unwitting agent to transport the stolen goods. 221 In
McAlevy, the defendant had falsely told a prospective buyer that
the owner had granted the defendant permission to sell certain
farm equipment.222 McAlevy also told the buyer to retrieve the
212. Id. at 712-13, 621 S.E.2d at 676.
213. Id. at 713, 621 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting Branche v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App.
480, 487, 489 S.E.2d 692, 695 (Ct. App. 1997)).
214. Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 266, 268, 623 S.E.2d 428, 429 (Ct. App.
2005).
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
216. 47 Va. App. 266, 623 S.E.2d 428 (Ct. App. 2005).
217. Id. at 268, 623 S.E.2d at 429.
218. Id. at 268-69, 623 S.E.2d at 429-30.
219. Id. at 272-73, 623 S.E.2d at 431-32.
220. 270 Va. 378, 620 S.E.2d 758 (2005).
221. See id. at 380, 620 S.E.2d at 759.
222. Id. at 379, 620 S.E.2d at 759.
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equipment after the "sale."223 In reliance on these false represen-
tations, the buyer removed the equipment, thereby satisfying the
element of asportation.224
K . Lynching and Gang Crimes
In Corado v. Commonwealth,225 the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia reviewed a case from Arlington County in which the prose-
cution relied on the lynching statute to successfully prosecute a
gang leader who participated in a fight that turned deadly.226 The
evidence showed that the defendant and his fellow gang members
arrived at a hotel prepared to fight a rival gang and that the de-
fendant participated in the fight.227 Corado contended that under
the lynching statutes, Virginia Code sections 18.2-38 and 18.2-39,
"the ultimate victim of the mob violence [must be] the mob's ini-
tial or specific, intended target."22' The court of appeals rejected
this construction, holding that the plain language of the two stat-
utes at issue only required an intent to commit an act of violence
upon "any person."229 Therefore, the fact that the defendant did
not intend to harm the specific person who was ultimately killed
was of no relevance.230
L. Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon
In Overbey v. Commonwealth,23' the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon due to the ambiguity in the predicate order from
the juvenile and domestic relations court. 23 '2 The order at issue
showed that the defendant had faced two charges, a felony charge
223. Id.
224. See id. at 379-80, 620 S.E.2d at 759.
225. 47 Va. App. 315, 623 S.E.2d 452 (Ct. App. 2005).
226. See id. at 321-22, 623 S.E.2d at 455.
227. Id. at 321, 623 S.E.2d at 455.
228. Id. at 326, 623 S.E.2d at 457.
229. Id. (finding that Virginia Code section 18.2-38 "states that a mob can come into
being if the individual members assemble with the intent of committing violence upon any
person").
230. See id. at 326-27, 623 S.E.2d at 457-58.
231. 271 Va. 231, 623 S.E.2d 904 (2006).
232. Id. at 234, 623 S.E.2d at 905-06.
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for burglary and a misdemeanor charge for petit larceny.233 The
order reflected that the defendant was found guilty-but not for
which offense-and that he had been sentenced to twelve months
in prison. 3' The ambiguity inherent in the order, the court held,
failed to establish that the defendant was convicted of a felony.235
Without the felony predicate, he could not be convicted of possess-
ing a firearm as a convicted felon.236
M. Sex Offender Registry
The defendant, on appeal, in Colbert v. Commonwealth, 237 con-
tended he could not be compelled to register as a sex offender be-
cause the person he had solicited for criminal sexual activity
turned out to be an undercover police officer rather than a thir-
teen-year-old girl.2 3' The defendant relied on Virginia Code sec-
tion 9.1-902(A)(2), which requires registration when the victim of
the applicable offense is a "minor."239 The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia rejected this interpretation, finding that a defendant is re-
quired to register regardless of the actual age of the target.24 °
This construction, the court held, accords with the entire struc-
ture and purpose of the statute, is most "consistent with the Act's
manifest remedial purpose of protecting children from sex offend-
ers," and avoids an absurd result.241
VI. DEFENSES
A. Double Jeopardy
Over the past year, Virginia appellate courts addressed a num-
ber of aspects of the prohibition against double jeopardy. In Roe v.
Commonwealth,24 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the
233. Id. at 232, 623 S.E.2d at 904.
234. See id. at 233, 623 S.E.2d at 905.
235. See id. at 234, 623 S.E.2d at 905-06.
236. See id., 623 S.E.2d at 906.
237. 47 Va. App. 390, 624 S.E.2d 108 (Ct. App. 2006).
238. Id. at 393, 624 S.E.2d at 109.
239. Id. at 394, 624 S.E.2d at 110.
240. See id. at 399, 624 S.E.2d at 113.
241. Id. at 400-01, 624 S.E.2d at 113.
242. 271 Va. 453, 628 S.E.2d 526 (2006).
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case of a defendant charged with abduction, shooting into an oc-
cupied dwelling, and some attendant firearm charges.2 43 When
the trial date arrived, the Commonwealth moved for a continu-
ance.244 The trial court refused, whereupon the prosecution
moved to "dismiss" the indictment.2 45 The trial court granted the
motion.2 46 When the Commonwealth later re-indicted Roe, he ar-
gued that the earlier dismissal precluded the new prosecution.2 47
The trial court rejected this argument, and, interpreting the or-
der, concluded that the earlier dismissal was in fact a "nol
pros. 2 4' The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that
while a court may interpret its own orders, that interpretation
must be reasonable.2 49 In the first prosecution, the Common-
wealth had moved to "dismiss" the charges and had not requested
a nolle presequi.2 0 The two procedures are distinct.251 Therefore,
the renewed indictments should have been dismissed on double
jeopardy grounds."'
The complex jurisdictional interplay between general district
courts and circuit courts is a frequent source of litigation and con-
fusion. In Painter v. Commonwealth,253 the defendant had been
was charged at the trial level with the felony offense of petit lar-
ceny, third offense.254 At her preliminary hearing, the Rocking-
ham County General District Court found that the Common-
wealth's tender of a report from the National Criminal
Information Center (NCIC) did not suffice to establish the defen-
dant's prior criminal record.255 The court convicted the defendant
of misdemeanor petit larceny.256 The defendant appealed to the
Rockingham County Circuit Court.257 Before her trial, the circuit
court granted the prosecution's motion to "nol pros" the misde-




247. Id. at 456, 628 S.E.2d at 527.
248. Id. at 456-57, 628 S.E.2d at 528.
249. Id. at 457-58, 628 S.E.2d at 528.
250. Id. at 458, 628 S.E.2d at 528-29.
251. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 529.
252. See id. at 459, 628 S.E.2d at 529.
253. 47 Va. App. 225, 623 S.E.2d 408 (Ct. App. 2005).
254. Id. at 230, 623 S.E.2d at 411.
255. See id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 231, 623 S.E.2d at 411.
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meanor larceny charge.25 The Commonwealth then obtained an
indictment for petit larceny, third offense.259 The defendant en-
tered a conditional plea, arguing that double jeopardy and collat-
eral estoppel barred the felony prosecution."' The Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia held that the defendant's decision to appeal the
judgment of the general district court rendered that judgment a
complete nullity.26' Moreover, since the circuit court never heard
evidence on the charge, jeopardy did not attach in that court.2 62
Therefore, the Commonwealth could obtain a "nol pros" of the
misdemeanor charge in the circuit court and thereafter indict her
for a felony offense.26 3 Finally, the court concluded that collateral
estoppel did not bar the felony prosecution. 264 A prerequisite to
the invocation of collateral estoppel is that the defendant was
previously acquitted of the offense.265 Similarly, res judicata re-
quires a judgment on the merits.266 A finding that the NCIC re-
port failed to establish probable cause of the prior larceny convic-
tions was neither a judgment on the merits that the prior
convictions did not exist, nor was it an acquittal.2 7
In Peake v. Commonwealth,268 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reviewed a case in which the police found a small quantity of
marijuana in the defendant's pocket.269 During the same search,
the police also uncovered a larger quantity of marijuana in a
lockbox. 27 ° The defendant admitted that the drugs found in the
lockbox were his.27 ' Peake was convicted in general district court
of possession of marijuana.272 He was later convicted in the circuit
court of possession with the intent to distribute based on the




261. Id. at 234, 623 S.E.2d at 412.
262. Id. at 234-35, 623 S.E.2d at 413.
263. See id.
264. Id. at 236, 623 S.E.2d at 413-14.
265. Id., 623 S.E.2d at 413
266. Id. at 237, 623 S.E.2d at 414.
267. Id.
268. 46 Va. App. 35, 614 S.E.2d 672 (Ct. App. 2005).
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tion was barred by double jeopardy.2 74 The court of appeals dis-
agreed, relying on the specific facts of the case.2 75 The key to the
analysis, the court held, was the defendant's intent with regard to
the "separate stash[es]."2 76 The court observed that the evidence
showed that the marijuana found in the lockbox was for distribu-
tion, whereas the drugs found in the defendant's pocket were for
personal use.277 Therefore, he was not prosecuted for the "same
offense" in violation of his double jeopardy rights.278
B. Impossibility
The defendant in Hix v. Commonwealth,279 following a sexually
charged discussion in an Internet "chat room," set up a meeting
with a person he believed to be a thirteen-year-old girl.28 ° In fact,
it was a special agent of the state police. 21 Hix was apprehended
and charged with attempted indecent liberties and use of a com-
munications system to solicit a minor.2 2 He argued that he could
not be convicted because it was impossible for him to consummate
the charged offenses with an adult police officer.28 3
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded the impossibility de-
fense did not apply under such circumstances.2 4 The court drew a
distinction between factual impossibility and legal impossibility:
Legal impossibility occurs when a defendant's actions, even if fully
carried out exactly as he intends, would not constitute a crime. Fac-
tual impossibility occurs when the actions intended by a defendant
are proscribed by the criminal law, but a circumstance or fact un-
known to the defendant prevents him from bringing about the in-
tended result. 285
274. Id. at 39, 614 S.E.2d at 674.
275. Id. at 41, 614 S.E.2d at 675.
276. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 50 M.J. 813, 815 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999)).
277. Id. at 42, 614 S.E. 2d at 676.
278. Id.
279. 270 Va. 335, 619 S.E.2d 80 (2005).
280. Id. at 338-39, 619 S.E.2d at 81-82.
281. Id. at 338, 619 S.E.2d at 81.
282. Id. at 340, 619 S.E.2d at 83.
283. Id. at 341-42, 619 S.E.2d at 83-84.
284. Id. at 345, 619 S.E.2d at 86.
285. Id. at 342, 619 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Parham v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 633,
636, 347 S.E.2d 172, 173-74 (Ct. App. 1986)).
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Legal impossibility is a valid defense, whereas factual impossi-
bility is not.286 The court noted that the true identity of the spe-
cial agent with whom Hix interacted was "an extraneous circum-
stance unknown to him and beyond his control."287 Such factual
circumstances provide no defense to the crime.288
C. Mental Retardation in Capital Cases
The Supreme Court of the United States, after holding that the
execution of a defendant who is mentally retarded would violate
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, or-
dered a resentencing to determine whether the defendant, Deryl
Atkins, was mentally retarded. 2 9 Following this proceeding, a
jury again sentenced Atkins to death.29 ° On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Virginia examined whether the Commonwealth's expert
should have been admitted and whether the jury was properly in-
formed that Atkins was previously sentenced to die.291' The court
answered both questions in the negative.292 First, the court con-
cluded that the Commonwealth's expert, a clinical psychologist
with extensive experience in assessing mental functioning, was
not qualified to testify about the defendant's mental retarda-
tion.293 The statute required an expert "'skilled in the administra-
tion, scoring and interpretation of ... measures of adaptive be-
havior. '294 The Commonwealth's expert acknowledged he had
never administered a standardized measure of adaptive behavior
and, therefore, under the plain language of the statute, he was
not "skilled" in the administration of such tests.295 Finally, the
court held it was prejudicial error for the jury who was sentenc-
ing Atkins anew to have been informed that a prior jury had sen-
286. See id. (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 11.5(a)(2), at 233 (2d ed. 2003)).
287. Id. at 346, 619 S.E.2d at 86.
288. Id.
289. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
290. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 144, 149, 631 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2006).
291. Id. at 149-50, 631 S.E.2d at 95.
292. Id. at 154, 157, 160, 631 S.E.2d at 98, 100, 102.
293. Id. at 154, 631 S.E.2d at 98.
294. Id. at 153, 631 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2(A) (Repl. Vol.
2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006)).
295. Id., 631 S.E.2d at 97-98.
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tenced Atkins to death.296 However, the trial court properly told
the jury that the defendant was convicted of capital murder and
that he would not be subject to the death penalty if he were found
to be mentally retarded.
2 97
D. Restoration of Rights
In Farnsworth v. Commonwealth,2 98 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia granted review of a conviction for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon.299 He had been convicted of a felony in West
Virginia, but his civil rights were restored by the West Virginia
Department of Corrections.0 ° The Supreme Court of Virginia, in
a per curiam opinion, held that the statute at issue, Virginia Code
section 18.2-308.2, contained only two exemptions permitting a
convicted felon to possess a firearm, and a restoration of civil
rights by a neighboring state was not one of them.30 1 Therefore,
the court affirmed his conviction. 0 2
E. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations specific to petit larceny is five years,
whereas the general statute of limitations for misdemeanors is
one year.30 3 In Foster v. Commonwealth, °4 the Supreme Court of
Virginia examined whether a prosecution for writing a bad check
must be brought within one year or five years.305 The court held
that under Virginia Code section 18.2-181, writing a bad check is
deemed larceny and, therefore, the five year statute of limitations
for larceny applied rather than the general one year limitations
period.306
296. Id. at 158, 631 S.E.2d at 100.
297. Id.
298. 270 Va. 1, 613 S.E.2d 459 (2005) (per curiam), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 1628 (2006).




303. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
304. 271 Va. 235, 623 S.E.2d 902 (2006).
305. Id. at 236, 623 S.E.2d at 902.
306. Id. at 238, 623 S.E.2d at 903.
[Vol. 41:83
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
VII. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
A. Motions to Modify or Reduce a Sentence
A limited avenue for seeking reduction of a sentence beyond
the narrow strictures of Rule 1:1 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia is found in Virginia Code section 19.2-303. That
statute provides in relevant part that when a person has been
sentenced for a felony to the Department of Corrections but has
not actually been transferred to a receiving unit of the depart-
ment, the court may at any time before the person is transferred
to the department, suspend or otherwise modify the unserved
portion of such a sentence." 7
In Commonwealth v. Neely,3 °s the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined the case of a defendant who was originally sentenced to
serve an entirely suspended sentence.3 °9 While on probation, he
was arrested and prosecuted by the federal government and was
ultimately sentenced to incarceration in the federal peniten-
tiary.31 ° After the federal proceeding, the circuit court revoked the
entirety of his suspended sentence.311 Almost four years later,
while still in federal custody, Neely sought to modify his sen-
tence.3 12 The circuit court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the motion.313 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed.
The court noted that under the plain language of the statute, so
long as Neely had not been transferred to the custody of the De-
partment of Corrections, the trial court could consider the mo-
tion.314 As he was not so transferred, the trial court erred in hold-
ing that it lacked jurisdiction to grant or deny the motion.31 '
307. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
308. 271 Va. 1, 624 S.E.2d 657 (2006).





314. Id. at 2-3, 624 S.E.2d at 657.
315. Id.
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B. Newly Discovered Evidence
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Orndorff v. Common-
wealth316 examined whether a defendant should have been
awarded a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence 317
and whether the trial court properly concluded that she was com-
petent to be sentenced." 8 Orndorff was convicted of murdering
her husband.319 She claimed after trial to have discovered that
she suffered from dissociative identity disorder (DID), which she
said could support an insanity defense.32 ° After she was evalu-
ated, both parties offered evidence on the subject of her compe-
tency.321 The trial court concluded that she was competent to be
sentenced. 322 During the sentencing phase, Orndorff presented
extensive expert evidence regarding her mental condition.323 Af-
ter the jury fixed her sentence, the court denied the motion for a
new trial.324 The court reasoned that the lengthy sentence im-
posed by the jury demonstrated that the jury had rejected the
psychiatric evidence presented by the defendant at sentencing.325
Regarding the issue of competency, the supreme court af-
firmed.326 The court reasoned that the trial court's factual finding
on the issue of competency should not be disturbed because there
was evidence in the record to support its finding of competency. 327
On the second issue, the court reversed. 32' The court noted that
newly discovered evidence will warrant a new trial if the evidence
(1) appears to have been discovered subsequent to the trial; (2) could
not have been secured for use at the trial in the exercise of reason-
able diligence by the movant; (3) is not merely cumulative, corrobo-
316. 271 Va. 486, 628 S.E.2d 344 (2006).
317. Id. at 501, 628 S.E.2d at 352.
318. Id. at 499, 628 S.E.2d at 351.
319. Id. at 490, 628 S.E.2d at 346.
320. Id.
321. See id. at 496-97, 628 S.E.2d at 349-50.
322. Id. at 495, 628 S.E.2d at 349.
323. Id. at 496-97, 628 S.E.2d at 349-50.
324. Id. at 490, 628 S.E.2d at 346.
325. See id. at 498, 628 S.E.2d at 350.
326. Id. at 500, 628 S.E.2d at 352.
327. See id. at 500-01, 628 S.E.2d at 352.
328. Id. at 506-07, 628 S.E.2d at 355-56.
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rative or collateral; and (4) is material, and such as should produce
opposite results on the merits at another trial.32 9
The second and fourth parts of this test were at issue.330
The court concluded that the defendant had, in fact, exercised
due diligence.331 She sought expert assistance prior to trial. 32
However, the experts could not reach a diagnosis of DID until af-
ter trial, when certain "alter" personalities first manifested them-
selves.333
Furthermore, the court held that in examining the motion for a
new trial, the trial court should not have relied on the jury's re-
jection at sentencing of the defendant's mitigation evidence in
concluding that the new evidence would not have altered the out-
come. 334 In effect, the trial court "substituted in place of its own
judgment the reaction of a jury that had already resolved crucial
credibility issues against" the defendant.335 Instead, the trial
court should have independently weighed the evidence.336 In ef-
fect, the trial court's role in weighing the materiality of newly dis-
covered evidence "resembles that of the fact finder."337 The im-
proper legal standard employed by the trial court mandated
remand for a determination of materiality under the proper stan-
dard.338
329. Id. at 501, 628 S.E.2d at 352 (quoting Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130,
301 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983)).
330. Id.
331. See id. at 503, 628 S.E.2d at 353.
332. See id.
333. Id. at 503-04, 628 S.E.2d at 353-54.
334. See id. at 505, 628 S.E.2d at 354-55.
335. Id.
336. See id., 628 S.E.2d at 355 (citing Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301
S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983)).
337. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 354 (citing Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 578, 587,
189 S.E. 144, 148 (1937); Holmes v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 963, 969, 157 S.E. 554, 556
(1931)).
338. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 355 (citing Thomas v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 233, 559
S.E.2d 652, 661 (2002)).
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VIII. LEGISLATION
A. Criminal Procedure
In circuit court proceedings, a defendant must file certain dis-
positive motions seven days before trial: motions seeking sup-
pression of evidence, motions for the dismissal of a warrant on
speedy trial or double jeopardy grounds, and motions to dismiss
based on the unconstitutionality of a statute.339 The General As-
sembly clarified that such motions need not be filed in advance in
general district court. 340 However, upon the filing of such a mo-
tion in the district court, the court must grant a continuance to
the prosecution upon a showing of good cause.341
If a court not of record in any criminal or traffic case rules that
a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional, the Commonwealth
can now appeal to the circuit court. 342 The lower court must issue
a written opinion, which is forwarded to the circuit court, and the
lower court must stay any further proceedings. If the circuit
court agrees that the statute or ordinance is unconstitutional, the
Commonwealth can appeal the circuit court's ruling to the Court
of Appeals of Virginia and to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 3"
On the other hand, if the circuit court disagrees and holds that
the statute or ordinance is constitutional, the matter is remanded
to the lower court for trial.34 5
B. Dangerous Dogs
Following several well publicized dog attacks, the General As-
sembly expanded the law covering dangerous animals. Now, law
enforcement officers as well as animal control officers can petition
the court for a finding that a dog is dangerous.3 6 A dangerous dog
339. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266.2 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
340. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 578, 2006 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-266.2 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
341. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 2006).




346. Id. § 3.1-796.93:1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
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must now be registered with a state registry.347 Finally, the law
provides graduated penalties against the owner of a dangerous
dog that attacks another companion cat or dog, or another human
being. 4s
C. Driving Offenses
Virginia law previously provided for a number of enhanced
penalties for a repeat DUI offense, provided the offense took place
within either five years or ten years of a "first offense." '49 The
General Assembly amended the statute to allow these enhanced
penalties for a DUI offense that occurs within five or ten years of
any prior DUI. 35 ° In other words, the enhancement can be trig-
gered by a new conviction occurring within five or ten years of
any prior conviction rather than a "first" conviction.35 ' A third
conviction within ten years for driving after forfeiture of one's
driver's license is now a Class 6 felony.35 2
The General Assembly also simplified the definition of reckless
driving. Reckless driving now consists of driving in excess of
twenty miles over the speed limit, or driving over eighty miles per
hour regardless of the speed limit.3 3
D. Drug Crimes
Existing law provides that a drug dealer or manufacturer who
is convicted of possession or manufacture of a specified large
quantity of certain drugs must be sentenced to a mandatory
minimum of twenty years in prison. 5' The General Assembly en-
acted a similar statute with a lower mandatory minimum sen-
tence if the prosecution proves possession, manufacture or distri-
bution of specified quantities of drugs, including 100 grams or
more of heroin, 500 grams or more of cocaine, and ten grams or
347. Id. § 3.1-796.93:3 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
348. See id. § 3.1-796.93:1(J) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
349. Id. § 18.2-270(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
350. Act of Mar. 23, 2006, ch. 82, 2006 Va. Acts _ (codifed as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-270(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
351. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-270(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
352. Id. § 18.2-272(A) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
353. Id. § 46.2-862 (Supp. 2006).
354. Id. § 18.2-248(H) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
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more of methamphetamine. 35 The court may decline to apply the
mandatory minimum if the defendant cooperates with law en-
forcement, it is his first offense, the defendant was not a leader or
an organizer, or the offense did not result in death or serious bod-
ily injury.3" 6
E. Identity Crimes
A person who is lawfully detained and who is asked to identify
himself by the police is now guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor if he
falsely identifies himself with the intent to deceive the officer.357
Identity theft is generally a Class 1 misdemeanor.358 The Gen
eral Assembly created enhanced penalties where the identifying
information of five or more persons is obtained in the same trans-
action or occurrence, in which case the offense is a Class 6 fel-
ony. 35 9 If the identities of fifty or more persons are concerned, the
offense is a Class 5 felony.3
60
F. Evidence
Properly authenticated copies of breath test records from the
Department of Forensic Science are now admissible into evi-
dence. 6'
To reduce the burden on the Department of Forensic Science, a
police officer is now permitted to testify concerning the results of
field tests for marijuana, but the test employed must be approved
by the Department of Forensic Science.362 However, a defendant
has the option of requesting a "full chemical analysis."363
355. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 759, 2006 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-248(C) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
356. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(C) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
357. Id. § 19.2-82.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
358. Id. § 18.2-186.3(D) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
359. Act of Mar. 31, 2006, ch. 455, 2006 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-186.3(D) (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
360. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.3(D) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
361. Id. § 18.2-268.9 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
362. Id. § 19.2-188.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
363. Id.
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The General Assembly modified the law to allow for compensa-
tion of employees of the commonwealth who testify as experts in
cases involving an insanity defense or an offense indicative of
sexual abnormality.364 A number of strictures limit the scope of
this statute.365
G. Gang Related Crimes
A new statute provides that brandishing a machete with the
intent to intimidate is a Class 1 misdemeanor.36 6 If the offense oc-
curs within 1,000 feet of a school, the offense is a Class 6 fel-
ony. 3
67
The list of predicate crimes for criminal street gangs has been
expanded to include threats to bomb and receiving money for pro-
curing a prostitute.368
H. Methamphetamine Precursors
To combat the growing problem of methamphetamine, the
General Assembly imposed restrictions on the manner and quan-
tity of sales of "precursors" to methamphetamine. 69 In general,
sellers are required to place the drugs behind the counter, keep a
log of purchasers, and demand a photo identification for sales.37 °
Violation of these provisions is a Class 1 misdemeanor.37'
I. Sexual Crimes
This year, sex offenders fared even worse in the General As-
sembly than in the courts.
364. Act of Mar. 23, 2006, ch. 114, 2006 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-175 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
365. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-175 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
366. See id. § 18.2-282.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
367. Id.
368. See id. § 18.2-46.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
369. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 865, 2006 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
248.8 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
370. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248.8(A)(3)(a)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
371. Id. § 18.2-248.8(D) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
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1. Sentencing Enhancements
Defendants convicted of rape, forcible sodomy, or object sexual
penetration now face hefty mandatory minimum sentences of
twenty-five years if certain aggravating circumstances are pre-
sent. Those circumstances include a disparity in age between a
young victim and the perpetrator, or the commission of the crime
in conjunction with burglary, breaking and entering, or abduc-
tion.372 In addition, the court must impose a sentence of no less
than forty years suspended for life upon the defendant's release
from confinement. 37 Finally, such convicts are forever barred
from work or volunteer activities on elementary or secondary
schools and child day centers. 374 A violation of this provision is a
Class 6 felony. 375 A forty-year suspended sentence also applies in
cases of abduction with the intent to obtain money, abduction
with the intent to defile, or abduction of a child under the age of
sixteen for purposes of concubinage or prostitution.376
A person who is convicted of rape, carnal knowledge of a child
between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, forcible sodomy, aggra-
vated sexual battery, object sexual penetration, taking indecent
liberties, or abduction with the intent to extort money or with the
intent to defile, and whose sentence includes a suspended period
of incarceration, must have that sentence suspended for at least
the same period of time as the maximum sentence for the of-
fense.3 7 Moreover, the defendant must be on probation for this
entire time.378
2. Leaving a Child with a Violent Sexual Offender
A child is now deemed abused or neglected when a parent or
caretaker creates a risk of physical or mental injury by knowingly
leaving a child with a person (1) who is not a relative by blood or
by marriage and (2) who is known by the parent or caretaker to
372. Id. §§ 18.2-61(A)(ii)-(iii), -61(B), -67.1(A)(1)-(2), -67.1(B), -67.2(A)(1)-(2), -67.2(B)
(Cum. Supp. 2006).
373. Id. § 18.2-48 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
374. Id. § 18.2-370.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
375. Id. § 18.2-370.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
376. Id. § 18.2-98 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
377. Id. § 19.2-303 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
378. Id.
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have been convicted of an offense against a minor for which regis-
tration as a violent sexual offender is required. ' 9
3. Registry
The General Assembly enacted a sweeping package of reforms
to strengthen registration requirements for sex offenders. The list
of crimes requiring registration has been expanded to include
possession of child pornography, even for a first offense, using a
communications system with a view to commit certain sexual acts
with children, murder of a child under the age of fifteen, murder
of a child in connection with an enumerated crime, and burglary
with the intent to commit one of the enumerated felonies.380
Sex offenders are required to be photographed and provide a
DNA sample when they register.38 ' The registrant must provide
information about his place of employment, and registration is
required within three days of release from confinement, or upon
arrival in Virginia, rather than the previous period of ten days. 3 2
Registration is also required for those convicted of similar of-
fenses in other countries. 3 3 The registrant must inform law en-
forcement within three days of any change in employment. 38 4 The
statute provides for periodic re-registration and new photographs
every two years. 385 Law enforcement must verify a registrant's in-
formation at regular intervals.8 6 After the passage of three to five
years, depending on the offense, the registrant can petition a
court for relief from the regular re-registration requirement. 387
Under the new statute, a second or subsequent conviction for
failing to register as a sex offender is a Class 6 felony and re-
quires global positioning system (GPS) monitoring while on su-
pervised probation, and a second or subsequent conviction of fail-
379. Id. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
380. Id. § 9.1-902 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
381. Id. § 9.1-903(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
382. Id.
383. Id. § 9.1-902(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
384. Id. § 9.1-903(E) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
385. Id. § 9.1-904(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
386. Id. § 9.1-907(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
387. Id. § 9.1-909(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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ing to register as a violent sex offender or murderer is a Class 5
felony and requires mandatory GPS monitoring.88
The legislation expands the list of offenses that qualify as
sexually violent offenses for the purposes of civil commitment.
The new predicates are abduction with intent to defile, abduction
of a child under sixteen years of age for the purpose of prostitu-
tion, carnal knowledge of a child between thirteen and fifteen
years of age, and carnal knowledge of minors in custody of the
court or the state.3 9 The requirement that the complaining wit-
ness be under thirteen years of age for aggravated sexual battery
to qualify as a predicate has been removed."D° A felony conviction
for conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit any of the quali-
fied offenses is also added as a qualifying offense.39'
A third conviction for peeping or spying into a dwelling will
now constitute a Class 6 felony.392
388. Id. § 18.2-472.1(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
389. Id. § 37.2-900 (Supp. 2006).
390. See Act of Mar. 20, 2005, ch. 185, 2005 Va. Acts 281 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
391. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (Supp. 2006).
392. Id. § 18.2-67.5:1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
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